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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California' is not primarily a pronouncement on and clarification of personal
jurisdiction and the minimum contacts test. Instead, the Court confronted the issue of
the reasonableness of judicial jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Applying the
minimum contacts test which the Court has developed in primarily domestic cases,
the Supreme Court was divided on the minimum contacts issue. The Justices
unanimously agreed, however, that assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant under
the conditions of the case was unreasonable.
This Case Comment examines the relationship of the Asahi case to past, present,
and future concepts of personal jurisdiction. Section II presents a brief overview of
the evolution of personal jurisdiction. The discussion in Section III first focuses on
the facts and holding of the case (Part A). Part B of Section III then analyzes the
Court's complex voting pattern in Asahi. This part considers the Court's application
of the threshold issue of minimum contacts as well as the Court's determination of the
fair play and substantial justice (reasonableness) issue. Section IV examines the
implications of the Asahi decision for future applications of the minimum contacts
standards (Part A) and for international law cases (Part B). Conclusions are set forth
in Part V. The final part of this Case Comment considers an apparently broadening
view of personal jurisdiction, the confusion in the lower courts as to the true
significance of the Asahi decision, and the Supreme Court's missed opportunity to
address the issue of personal jurisdiction in international cases.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The modern view of jurisdiction2 developed from International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,3 a 1945 decision in which the Supreme Court established the "mini-
mum contacts" test.4 That test had fairness and reasonableness as its ends with a
consideration of the defendant's contacts with the forum state as a means to those
ends. 5 The Court's new due process standard for personal jurisdiction required only
1. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
2. For comprehensive discussions of the evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine in the Supreme Court, see J.
FRIEDENTuAL, M. KAN & A. MnTacE, CcvI. PocEouRE, sec. 3 (1985); C. WIor, THE LAW OF FEDERAL Couiirs, sec. 64
(1983); Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNE.L L. REv. 411
(1981); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner. The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REiv. 33 (1978).
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. Id. at 316. Chief Justice Stone wrote, "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "Id. (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
5. Id. at 316-17.
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that the "demands [of due process] may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system
of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there.'" 6
The use of the term minimum contacts to describe the requirements of due
process suggested to some an approach that focused attention on assessing the
defendant's physical connection with the state.7 A second approach emphasized the
fairness of requiring a defendant to defend this suit in this forum. Under this second
approach, while the defendant must have some contact, tie, or relation to the forum
state, it need not be a physical act or even an event that the defendant caused.8
Language in International Shoe lends support to this broader fairness interpretation
and strongly suggests that the Court was concerned less with contacts and more with
fair play and substantial justice:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities
which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be
simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes been suggested,
whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in
another state, is a little more or a little less.... Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That
clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against
an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.9
In 1957, the Supreme Court decided McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. '0
in a manner consistent with its approach in International Shoe. The Court seemingly
endorsed the fairness view and rejected the notion that due process requires physical
contact to justify jurisdiction. " On the basis of a single contract between a California
resident and a Texas insurance company, the Supreme Court found it reasonable for
California to assert jurisdiction over the Texas insurance company. 12 The Court
stressed the forum's strong interest in protecting its citizens,' 3 the plaintiff's interest
6. Id. at 317.
7. R. CASAD, JURISDIC'ION rN CIVIL AcrIONS, sec. 2.02[4][b] (1983) [hereinafter R. CASAD]. See, e.g., Aaron Ferer
& Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel, 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1977); Pennington v. Toyomenka, Inc., 512 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1975); Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. BIJ Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 449
F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. National Sportsmen's Club, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Okla.
1971); Saletko v. Willys Motors, Inc., 36 Ill. App. 2d 7, 183 N.E.2d 569 (1962); White v. Goldthwaite, 204 Kan. 83,
460 P.2d 578 (1969); Latham v. Ryan, 373 So. 2d 242 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods.,
Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).
8. R. CASAD, supra note 7, sec. 2.02[4][b]. See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d
220 (6th Cir. 1972); Kourkene v. American BBR, Inc., 313 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1963); Thermal Insulation Sys., Inc., v.
Ark-Seal Corp., 508 F. Supp. 434 (D. Kan. 1980); Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc., v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998 (N.D.
Il. 1967); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966); Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I1l. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
9. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
10. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
11. R. CASAD, supra note 7, sec. 2.02[4][d].
12. The Texas insurance company maintained no offices or sales staff and did no continuous business in California.
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957).
13. California had adopted a statute authorizing service of process on nonresident insurance companies. Id. at 223.
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in a convenient forum and ready availability of witnesses, 14 and little inconvenience
for the defendant.' 5
By 1958, the Supreme Court's view of the underlying due process restrictions on
personal jurisdiction and the minimum contacts test underwent a significant shift in
emphasis.' 6 The Court's decision in Hanson v. Denckla17 called into question the
continued validity of the McGee holding that a single contract satisfied the minimum
contacts test. In Hanson, the Court refused to allow Florida to assert jurisdiction over
a Delaware trustee. The trustee's only contact with Florida was that the deceased
creator of the Delaware trust moved to Florida and exercised power of appointment
over the trust while living there.' 8 The Court rejected the contention that Florida was
the "center of gravity" of the dispute and was therefore a fair and reasonable
forum. 19 No court may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the Court
emphasized, unless the nonresident has "purposefully availed" himself or herself of
the "benefits and protection" of the forum state.20
By the time of its 1980 decision in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,21 the
Supreme Court had clearly articulated its International Shoe standard as a two-step
analysis. 22 The Court stated that determination of personal jurisdiction begins with
consideration of whether a nonresident defendant had minimum contacts such that the
defendant "purposefully availed" himself or herself of the benefits and protection of
the forum state.23 If a defendant could reasonably foresee being "haled into court"
in the state, that foreseeability was evidence of purposeful availment. 24 Only if
minimum contacts are present should the reasonableness and fairness of the forum's
assertion of jurisdiction be considered. 25 Relevant to this determination of reason-
ableness and fairness are the interests of the forum and plaintiff as well as the
potential burden on the defendant. 26
Discussion concerning reasonableness consumes only two paragraphs of the
World-Wide Volkswagen opinion. The remainder is devoted to the second part of the
minimum contacts test: ensuring that states respect the prerogatives of other sover-
eigns. World-Wide Volkswagen clearly indicates that these federalism considerations
supersede the concerns of convenience of the forum and interest of the forum in trying
the case.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen contended that
the majority focused too "tightly" on contacts between the defendant and the
14. Id. at 223.
15. Id. at 224.
16. Stephens, The Single Contract as Minimum Contacts: Justice Brennan "Has It His Way," 28 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 89, 92 (1986) [hereinafter Stephens, Single Contract].
17. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
18. Id. at 238, 252.
19. Id. at 254.
20. Id. at 253.
21. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. Id. at 291-92.
23. Id. at 297.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 294.
26. Id. at 292.
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forum. 27 "In so doing, they accord," he argued, "too little weight to the strength of
the forum State's interest in the case and fail to explore whether there would be any
actual inconvenience to the defendant. "28 The Court ignored, Brennan claimed, the
"essential inquiry" of International Shoe-the question of "fair play and substantial
justice." 29 Rejecting the majority's defendant focus, Justice Brennan advocated an
approach that would find satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements when "the forum
State has an interest in permitting the litigation to go forward, the litigation is
connected to the forum, and the burden of defending is not unreasonable. "30
The Court's subsequent 1982 decision in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee3' contained language that suggested a retreat
from its emphasis on "interstate federalism" in World-Wide Volkswagen. In a
footnote to the majority opinion, Justice White qualifies his own language in
World-Wide Volkswagen:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.,
however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by
the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.3 2
Although interstate federalism is an important federal constitutional concern, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not address that concern. The purpose
of the due process clause is to protect persons against unfair or arbitrary treatment at
the hands of the government. 33 If the due process standard of International Shoe makes
it fair to adjudicate in the court of one state, then the interests of interstate federalism,
embodied in the full faith and credit clause of article IV of the Constitution, will be
served by requiring that all states give effect to that state's judgment. 34
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 35 Justice Brennan wrote the majority
opinion which reflected his previously expressed concerns that the minimum contacts
test was outdated and that emphasis on defendants was unnecessary. 36 Brennan
arguably moved the Court toward a more multifactored analysis, which considers
contacts of all aspects of the litigation to the forum as well as the reasonableness of
asserting jurisdiction based on those contacts. 37 Echoing his contentions in his dissent
in World-Wide Volkswagen, Brennan stated that a showing of contacts creates a
presumption of reasonableness that the defendant must overcome in order to resist the
forum's assertion of personal jurisdiction. 38 One commentator has suggested that the
Court has adopted an approach that emphasizes fairness and reasonableness of the
27. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 299-300.
29. Id. at 300.
30. Id. at 302.
31. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
32. Id. at 703 n.10.
33. R. CASAD, supra note 7, sec. 2.04[2][e].
34. Id.
35. 471 U.S. 462 (1984).
36. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
37. Stephens, Single Contract, supra note 16, at 117.
38. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483-85 (1984).
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forum and the interests of all the parties, the forum, and the judicial system itself. The
defendant's connection with the forum state is merely a prerequisite for jurisdiction,
a prerequisite that is easily met. Even a tenuous relationship of the defendant with the
forum state would be sufficient if the forum were fair and reasonable. 39
With this background of personal jurisdiction, the Asahi decision can now be
examined.
IlI. ASAI METAL INDUSTRY Co. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA:
FACrs, HOLDING, AND ANALYSIS
A. Facts and Holding
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., (Asahi) manufactured tire valve assemblies in
Japan and sold them to several tire manufacturers, including Cheng Shin Rubber
Industrial Co. (Cheng Shin), for use as components in tire tubes. Asahi's sales to
Cheng Shin occurred in Taiwan, and Asahi shipped the tire valve assemblies from
Japan to Taiwan. Cheng Shin incorporated the assemblies into its finished tires, which
Cheng Shin sold, among other places, in the United States. Asahi was aware that the
valve assemblies sold to Cheng Shin would end up in California. In an affidavit, a
manager of Cheng Shin whose duties included purchase of component parts stated that
he would have discussed with Asahi the fact that Cheng Shin's tubes were sold
throughout the world and specifically in the United States. On the other hand, the
president of Asahi declared in an affidavit that Asahi had never contemplated that sales
to Cheng Shin in Taiwan would subject it to lawsuits in California. 40
A California resident brought a product liability suit in California Superior Court
arising from a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by defects in a tire manufactured
by Cheng Shin. Cheng Shin filed a cross-complaint for indemnification from Asahi.
After settlement of the main suit, the Superior Court denied Asahi's motion to quash
Cheng Shin's service of summons. Both the trial court and the California Supreme
Court ruled that personal jurisdiction over Asahi was authorized by California's
long-arm statute4' and Asahi had to defend the action in California. 42 The Supreme
Court of the United States disagreed in a complex voting pattern. 43
39. See generally Stephens, Single Contract, supra note 16.
40. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1029-30 (1987).
41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Vest 1973) states: "A court of this state may exercisejurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or of the United States."
California's long-ann statute subjects nonresidents to jurisdiction on the ground of their transacting business in the
state. It is necessarily more restrictive in its application than a "single act" statute, since the nonresident must have more
contacts with California in order to come within statutory limits. Courts have equated "doing business" with such
minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of a suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. California courts have recognized that "doing business," as used in the California statute, does not
require repeated and successive transactions in California. See, e.g., Long v. Mishicot Modern Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App.
2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967) (stating that where the cause of action arises out of economic activity courts have held
that contacts need not consist of repeated or continuous business transactions). California courts have also recognized that
in some situations a single transaction within the state may render the nonresident amenable to process. See, e.g., Long
v. Mishicot Modern Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967); Eclipse Fuel Eng'g Co. v. Superior
Court of San Francisco, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957).
42. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1031.
43. Id. Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court
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B. Analysis
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California44 presented the
Supreme Court with the opportunity to address the amenability of a Japanese
component part manufacturer to jurisdiction in California, where the defendant had
no direct contacts. 45 A unanimous court reversed the California state court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. 46 Writing for the court, Justice
O'Connor declared that the mere awareness of a foreign defendant that the
components that it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would
reach the forum state in the stream of commerce did not constitute minimum contacts.
Exercise of personal jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the notions of fair play
and substantial justice. 47
The Supreme Court applied the minimum contacts test, which the Court has
interpreted as serving two functions:
The concept of minimum contacts . . . can be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a
federal system. 4
First, the Court examined Asahi's contacts with the forum state to determine if they
were sufficient to satisfy due process. World-Wide Volkswagen clearly indicates that
the limitations imposed by the notions of sovereignty are of threshold importance. 49
These concerns prevail over forum convenience and forum interests. 50 The World-
Wide Volkswagen Court referred to the due process clause as an "instrument of
interstate federalism" and stressed that jurisdiction may be defeated however
minimal the burden of litigating or however strong the interest of the forum state.-5
Second, even if the Court found minimum contacts, the Court inquired whether the
exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi would be fair and reasonable. 52
with respect to Part I (the facts of the case); an opinion of the Court with respect to Part I1-B on reasonableness and fairness
of the exercise of jurisdiction, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, and Stevens joined; and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A on minimum contacts and III (the holding), in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia joined. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, in which Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices White and Blackmun joined.
44. Id.
45. Stein, Styles ofArgument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. Rev. 689,
761-62 (1987).
46. Graydon Staring, counsel for Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., has claimed that this was the first unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court finding no personal jurisdiction since the ruling in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). Stewart, Shortening California's Long Arm, 73 A.B.A. J. 45 (1987) [hereinafter, Stewart, Long
Arm].
47. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1035.
48. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
49. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1031-33.
50. Id. See also Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59
N.C.L. Rev. 429, 438 (1981) [hereinafter Jay, Minimum Contacts].
51. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
52. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1031.
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1. Due Process Analysis
a. Part II-A of the Plurality Opinion
In Part 11-A of the Court's plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that
Asahi's action did not constitute minimum contacts. The Chief Justice and Justices
Powell and Scalia joined her in this part of the opinion. She began her analysis of the
due process issue with a reaffirmance of the principle that the defendant's actions are
the basis for finding minimum contacts.5 3 Justice O'Connor stated that she was
following the reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla54 which indicated that minimum
contacts had to have a basis in the defendant's purposeful availment of the privilege
of conducting business or activities within the forum state. 55 She traced this line of
reasoning from International Shoe,56 in which Court reasoned:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.57
In support of her focus on the defendant's contacts, Justice O'Connor quoted from
Burger King, the Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding personal
jurisdiction. 58 However, the language that Justice O'Connor chose to cite consisted
largely of quotations from the earlier International Shoe, Hanson v. Denckla, and
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. line of cases. 59
Justice O'Connor then addressed how the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen6°
applied "the principle that minimum contacts must be based on an act of the
defendant.''61 The World-Wide Volkswagen Court "rejected the assertion that a
consumer's unilateral act of bringing the defendant's product into the forum State was
a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant." 62 Justice O'Connor
considered the problems of foreseeability and stream of commerce. World-Wide
Volkswagen has been understood, she said, two ways:
Some courts have understood the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in World-Wide
Volkswagen, to allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be based on no more than the
defendant's act of placing the product into the stream of commerce. Other courts have
understood the Due Process Clause and the above-quoted language in World-Wide
Volkswagen to require the action of the defendant to be more purposefully directed at the
forum State than the mere act of placing a product in the stream of commerce. 63
Justice O'Connor then presented a cursory review of lower court decisions that
interpreted the concepts of stream of commerce and purposeful availment. She
53. Id.
54. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
55. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1031.
56. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
57. Id. at 316.
58. 471 U.S. 462 (1984).
59. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1031.
60. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
61. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1031.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1032.
19881
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
declared the first position, one with which the position of the Supreme Court of
California was consistent, to be at odds with the requirements of due process.
Jurisdiction required, Justice O'Connor stated, "[a]dditional conduct,"64 an action of
the defendant directed toward the forum state. On the basis of the facts presented in
the case, Justice O'Connor reasoned that "the exertion of personal jurisdiction over
Asahi by the Superior Court of California exceed[ed] the limits of Due Process." 6 5
Even if Asahi were aware that some of its component parts would end up in products
sold in the United States, that awareness would not be enough. Asahi had not
purposefully availed itself of the California market. Facts did not indicate that:
Asahi did business in California, had an office, agents or employees or property in
California, advertised in California or otherwise solicited business in California. Moreover,
it did not create, control or employ the distribution system that brought its valve assemblies
to California. Nor was there any evidence that Asahi designed its product in anticipation of
sales in California. 6
b. Justice Brennan's Holding on Minimum Contacts
If Justice O'Connor was attempting to clarify the stream of commerce passage
in World-Wide Volkswagen and its function in the minimum contacts analysis, a
majority of the Justices did not agree with her position. 67 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan disagreed with both Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the stream
of commerce theory and her conclusion that Asahi did not purposefully avail itself of
the privileges of California.6 8 Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in
Justice Brennan's opinion about the minimum contacts issue.
Justice Brennan argued that Justice O'Connor endorsed the "minority view" of
the stream of commerce theory that requires a more purposeful availment by the
defendant. 69 Furthermore, the view "represent[ed] a marked retreat" from the
Court's analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen.70 Justice Brennan found no need for
"[a]dditional conduct" beyond the placement of the product into the stream of
commerce. 71 According to Justice Brennan, the stream of commerce is "the regular
and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale." 72 If
a business participant places goods in the stream of commerce, the possibility of a
lawsuit cannot be a surprise to that participant. In addition, the litigation is not a
burden for which the participant receives no corresponding benefit. 73
Justice Brennan cited language in World-Wide Volkswagen that supported his
64. Id. at 1033.
65. Id.
66. Griffin, U.S. Supreme Court Offers Guidance on Assertions of Jurisdiction over Foreign Manufacturers, 15
INT'L Bus. l-w. 196, 197 (1987). See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1030-31.
67. Recent Development, Foreign Manufacturer Not Subject to Domestic Jurisdiction in Absence of Minimum
Contacts, 22 Tex. Iur'L L.J. 403, 407 (1987) [hereinafter Recent Development].
68. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 1036.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1035.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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position on minimum contacts. He stated that the reasoning of the Court in
World-Wide Volkswagen was that a corporation who may reasonably anticipate
litigation in a particular forum cannot claim that such litigation is unfair.74 The
corporation had the choice, as the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen stated, of
insuring itself, passing expected costs on to consumers, or severing connections with
the state. 75
Justice Brennan pointed out that the World-Wide Volkswagen Court had cited
with approval the holding in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.7 6
In Gray, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the stream of commerce theory and
asserted jurisdiction over a component-parts manufacturer with no direct sales in
Illinois but with sales to a manufacturer who incorporated the component parts into
a final product that was sold in Illinois. 77 Justice Brennan asserted that the Court in
World-Wide Volkswagen carefully distinguished cases in which a chain of distribution
delivered the goods to the forum state from cases in which a consumer transported
them to the forum state. In Asahi, Justice Brennan stated that the California Supreme
Court had taken notice of this difference, correctly concluded that the holding in
World-Wide Volkswagen preserved the stream of commerce theory, and found facts
to support a finding of minimum contacts. 78
c. Justice Stevens's Holding on Minimum Contacts
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and
Blackmun, declined to reach the minimum contacts issue. 79 However, if the test of
minimum contacts should have been formulated in the Asahi case, Justice Stevens
stated that "Part 1-A misapplie[d] it to the facts of this case." 80 In fact, Justice
Stevens went on to state that "in most circumstances [he] would be inclined to
conclude that a regular course of dealing" such as Asahi conducted "would
constitute 'purposeful availment'" of California's market, even though the product
was a standard one delivered world-wide. 81 Justice Stevens said that arguably Asahi
had engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than merely placement of its product in
the stream of commerce. 82
74. Id. at 1036. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court said:
Mhe foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum State. Rather, it is the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there.
World-wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
75. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1036.
76. Id. at 1037 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1037 (Brennan, J., concurring). See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. Justice Stevens is referring to Asahi's regular course ofdealing with Cheng Shin which resulted in deliveries
of over 100,000 units per year over a period of years.
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2. Part l-B of the Plurality Opinion: Fair Play and Substantial Justice
After addressing the due process component of minimum contacts, the Court
considered the issue of the fairness and reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction
over Asahi. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Eight Justices 83
concurred in this section of the opinion, which was couched in language of "fair play
and substantial justice."4
The Court purported to decide the case on the basis of the evaluation of a number
of factors. These included the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum
state, the plaintiff's interests, and the states' interests in the most efficient resolution
of controversies and the advancement of fundamental substantive social policies. 85
The Court evaluated these factors and found that the assertion of jurisdiction over
Asahi would be unreasonable. 86
The Court determined that the burden on the defendants was especially onerous.
Asahi would have been forced to defend a contract action based on a Taiwanese
contract in the judicial system of a foreign nationA7 The Court stated, "The unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should
have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of
personal jurisdiction over national borders.' 88
The Court then discussed the other factors. The plaintiff, Cheng Shin, had not
demonstrated that California was a more convenient forum for the litigation of its
claim than Taiwan or Japan. 89 California had no clear interest in the dispute, since
neither party resided in California and the dispute was about indemnity and not safety
standards. Furthermore, it was not clear that California law would govern the
dispute. 90
The Court did not consider only the interests of the other states in the efficient
resolution of the Asahi dispute and in policy advancement. Since World-Wide
Volkswagen admonished courts to consider interests of the "several States" as well
as the forum state, the Asahi Court felt itself obligated to also consider the procedural
and substantive policies of other nations whose interests might be affected by a
California court's assertion of jurisdiction.91 The interests of those other nations as
well as the federal interest in its foreign relations policies would be "best served by
a careful inquiry into the assertion of jurisdiction" and by "an unwillingness to find
the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests on the part
of the plaintiff or the forum state.' '92
83. Only Justice Scalia did not join in this section of the opinion.
84. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1033 (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
85. Id. at 1034.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1035.
92. Id. at 1034-35.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. The Court's Approaches to the Analysis of Minimum Contacts
Several relatively well-defined minimum contacts standards are available to the
Court when it decides questions of personal jurisdiction. Each standard is applicable
to a different subject matter or context. The Court in Asahi had available to it
standards previously applied in precedential (or at least persuasive) decisions in
contexts related to stream of commerce, product liability, component parts, and the
international arena.
1. Stream of Commerce
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan stated that they were applying the
stream of commerce analysis as set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen. However, they
reached different conclusions. 93 Justice O'Connor found insufficient minimum
contacts in a stream of commerce context where the defendant had no purposeful
affiliation. 94 Justice Brennan based jurisdiction on the defendant's regular placement
of the product in the stream of commerce, such that the defendant realized benefits
sufficient to offset the burden of litigation. 95
Significantly, Justice White, the author of the World-Wide Volkswagen decision,
appeared to reconsider the requirement of purposeful action by a defendant to direct
its product toward the forum state. The suggestion has been made that Justice White
has retreated from World-Wide Volkswagen. 96 World-Wide Volkswagen placed a
significant limit on the use of long-arm statutes in product liability suits against
out-of-state manufacturers and vendors. Mere foreseeability that a product would
enter the forum state was not enough to establish personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state manufacturer or vendor. The action of the defendant had to be more
purposefully directed. 97 In Asahi, Justice White joined in Justice Brennan's concur-
ring opinion and, thus, in his position that Asahi's placement of component parts into
the stream of commerce, without more, was purposeful availment.
The Court's position on the stream of commerce theory, therefore, seems to
have shifted to what Justice Brennan would term the majority view, the view that
placement of goods into the stream of commerce without more is sufficient
purposeful availment. Only three other Justices concurred with Justice O'Connor in
her narrow reading of stream of commerce and purposeful availment. Five Justices
indicated that a more expansive view of personal jurisdiction may prevail at the
Supreme Court. 98
93. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
94, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
95, Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96, Stewart, Long Arm, supra note 46, at 46.
97, Word-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
98. Stewart, Long Arm, supra note 46, at 45.
1988]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
2. Product Liability
The Supreme Court has also distinguished among cases that deal with these
types of subject matter:99 product liability, 00 family law,101 and contract disputes. 102
World-Wide Volkswagen should be consulted when the subject, as in Asahi, is a
product liability action. The World-Wide Volkswagen holding means that for a state
to be able to assert personal jurisdiction, the defendant corporation must have
commercially benefitted from the forum contact or have sought a market in the
forum. 03 As Justice Brennan pointed out, Justice O'Connor applied the World-Wide
Volkswagen test without regard for the caveat in that decision that the Gray holding
was proper in a component-parts context. 14 The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
determined that the defendant should be able to predict that he would be liable to suit
in a particular forum and also be able to take measures to avoid that risk. However,
the Court did not doom all product liability cases to dismissal from forums other than
the place of manufacture or sale.10 5 The Court explicitly sanctioned Gray, where the
manufacturer had sold a defective component part to an intermediary who used it in
the assembly of a final product. 06 Apparently, the Court distinguished Gray because
the plaintiff-customer had not transported the product to the forum state. Instead, the
component-parts manufacturer had placed its products into the stream of commerce
and expected purchase by consumers in the forum state.' 07
3. Component Parts
Obviously, component-parts actions are a special subset of the product liability
area. Justice Brennan took notice of this added dimension of the Asahi case and came
up with a result different from that of Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor relied only
on the World-Wide Volkswagen holding.' 08 In Asahi, as in Gray, the sale of
component parts to another manufacturer who incorporated those components into its
products added an extra step to the distribution chain. The distinction between
99. Pershbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied: Mr. Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 1986 ARIz. ST. L.J. 585, 629-30 (1986) [hereinafter Pershbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied].
100. Id. at 629-30. Pershbacher says that if a question of personal jurisdiction arises in a product liability action,
World-Wide Volkswagen should be consulted, "as it was in Asahi." Id. at 630. The defendant must have had a
commercially beneficial forum contact or have sought a market in the forum state. Jurisdiction will be found, however,
if the defendant knowingly causes intangible effects-even without any economic benefit to the defendant. See Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (knowingly writing a news story about a California resident was sufficient to assert
jurisdiction in California over nonresident reporter and editor who did not have commercially beneficial forum contact).
101. Pershbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied, supra note 99, at 630. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,
reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978), provides the test in a family law matter. In Kulko, jurisdiction was not available in
a state where family members resided, if their presence resulted from a consensual agreement with a nonresident
defendant.
102. Pershbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied, supra note 99, at 630. In a contract dispute, the sources of analysis
are Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957). Consensual agreements with residents will usually be sufficient to find jurisdiction over a nonresident.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
105. Jay, Minimum Contacts, supra note 50, at 442-43.
106. Id. at 443.
107. Id. But the Court presumably knew that the record in Gray failed to show that any other of the defendant's
products were in the forum.
108. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
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component-parts cases and regular product liability cases in the minds of the Court
seems to be the degree of control exerted by the manufacturer. The component-parts
manufacturer places his product into the stream of commerce of his own volition and
for a financial benefit. Theoretically, the component-parts manufacturer can ascertain
the destination of his product and make other arrangements if resultant multistate' 09
jurisdictional exposure is objectionable. "0
The more common situation seems to be the Gray"' fact pattern. There, the
defendant was uninformed as to the volume of its product in the forum and could not
influence the distribution process. 112 The defendant in both types of cases-
component-parts and regular product liability-seems to be at the mercy of another.
The component-parts manufacturer is no less subject to the intervention of someone
over whom he has little or no control than the regular manufacturer whose product
may be removed to another forum by the purchaser. Furthermore, cases such as Gray
do not turn on the degree of control exercised by the defendant over its product. The
courts made a realistic appraisal of the modern economic system and the convenience
of the parties and determined that the assertion of jurisdiction was reasonable under
the circumstances." 3
The judicial system has not, however, analogized component-parts actions and
portable torts. It has afforded disparate treatment to component-parts actions as
represented by Gray and to portable torts, which are injuries caused by products that
the consumer/buyer transports to another forum, as illustrated by World-Wide
Volkswagen. 14 Each of these kinds of cases is identical as far as the damaged plaintiff
is concerned. "5 One commentator on personal jurisdiction, Professor Jay, points out
the inherent unfairness:
Those who are hurt by products purchased in the forum clear the initial barriers to litigating
at home and can rely on the "reasonableness" side of the minimum contacts standard....
Persons in the Woodsons' [the injured party in World-Wide Volkswagen] position must
simply remain silent, despite the existence of any number of arguments that might establish
their forum choice as an entirely fair one." 6
Professor Jay also argues that the growth of long-arm jurisdiction in areas like product
liability will have been for naught if the consumer cannot bring suit against the
manufacturer in a forum convenient to the consumer. He states:
The great gains made by consumers through the expansion of substantive liability over the
makers and sellers of defective goods would be effaced if the injured buyer could not afford
109. "Multistate" is interchangeable with multi-national or international.
110. Jay, Minimum Contacts, supra note 50, at 444.
Ill. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also
Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
112. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432,442-43, 176 N.E.2d 761, 764 (1961).
113. Jay, Minimum Contacts, supra note 50, at 445.
114. Portable torts are those injuries that are caused by a product that the purchaser bought outside the forum and
then transported into the forum. Any relationship between the manufacturer's forum state contacts and the particular
product injury may be lacking. Problems in finding jurisdiction are especially evident when the product reaches a forum
that is outside the normal chain of distribution of the manufacturer or a middleman.
115. Jay, Minimum Contacts, supra note 50, at 448.
116. Id.
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the burden of suit. Given the physical distance between modern manufacturers/distributors
and their ultimate buyers-a setup encouraged by business for economic advantage-the
danger of uncompensated loss to the consumer is very real unless plaintiffs can compel the
attendance of defendants in a reasonable forum: 117
Justice Brennan's position, which was the majority position in Asahi, II would
preserve for the customer/plaintiff the ability to litigate component-parts actions in a
forum convenient to the customer/plaintiff. He made no inroads into the World-Wide
Volkswagen holding regarding product liability cases in general. Justice Brennan did
maintain the status quo in component-parts cases by finding sufficient minimum
contacts by Asahi.
B. The International Context
All the Justices agreed, however, that regardless of whether Asahi purposefully
availed itself of the market in the forum state, California could not constitutionally
exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi. Notably, for the first time ever, Justice
Brennan did not find personal jurisdiction. 119 With the exception of Justice Scalia, the
entire Court concurred that personal jurisdiction simply would be unreasonable. 120
The critical consideration was the resolution of all other aspects of the lawsuit except
for Cheng Shin's claim against Asahi.121 The remaining claim was, after all, for
indemnification of one foreign corporation by another foreign corporation.
1. The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Issue of Jurisdiction in
International Cases
The Court said it decided the Asahi case on the bases of minimum contacts and
personal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Court's reasoning in Part 11-B of the plurality
opinion indicated that the Court approached the case as a jurisdictional challenge by
a foreign defendant. One writer has suggested that the case presents "a classic
argument for forum non conveniens: two foreign parties, a foreign contract, foreign
law presumably applicable, and all witnesses and exhibits (with the exclusion of the
tire, which could easily be transported to Taiwan) in a foreign state."'' 22
Professor Born, author of an article that advocates a special standard of judicial
jurisdiction for international cases, believes that the Supreme Court has failed to
provide guidance to lower courts for resolving jurisdictional challenges by foreign
defendants. Most such challenges are grounded in part on the due process clause.'13
Only two prior Supreme Court decisions had involved due process challenges by
117. Id. at 446.
118. See supra notes 68-70 and 79-82 and accompanying text about Justice White's concurring opinion as well as
the three Justices who joined in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion.
119. Stewart, Long Arm, supra note 46, at 46.
120. Justice Scalia joined only the minimum contacts holding, but that alone would have defeated the exercise of
jurisdiction.
121. Stewart, Long Arm, supra note 46, at 46.
122. Recent Development, supra note 67, at 409.
123. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. lNr'L & CoMP. L. 1, 6 (1987)
[hereinafter Born, Reflections]. Justice O'Connor cites to this article in her plurality opinion. See supra footnotes 87-92
and accompanying text.
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foreigners to a state court's jurisdiction: Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co.124 and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall.125 In both cases, the
Supreme Court applied the minimum contacts test developed in domestic cases and
did not question the appropriateness of that test's usage in an international case.
In Perkins, the Supreme Court found general jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in two actions for distribution of dividends and the issuance of stock
certificates. The Perkins plaintiff sued in Ohio, although the defendant mining
company was organized under laws of the Philippines. While the company's mining
operations were suspended during World War II by the Japanese invasion of the
islands, the president, who was the principal stockholder of Benguet, maintained an
office in Ohio. The president did business on behalf of the company and kept
company files in Ohio. 126 The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was permissible
over the nonresident defendant, even if the cause of action did not arise out of or
relate to the business done in the state, provided that the defendant's contacts with the
forum were "substantial" 127 or "continuous and systematic." 128
In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court applied this "continuous and systematic"
activities standard for claims not arising out of the defendant's in-state activities. The
defendant was a Colombian corporation that provided helicopter transportation in
South America for oil construction companies. It contracted with Consorcio to
provide such services in connection with a pipeline in Peru. Plaintiffs filed wrongful
death claims after Consorcio employees were killed when a helicopter supplied and
piloted by the defendant crashed in Peru. 129 The Supreme Court held that the
defendant's contacts with Texas did not constitute minimum contacts and the
wrongful death claims did not arise out of the defendant's activities in the forum. The
issue was whether the defendant's activities, which consisted mainly of purchases in
the forum, were continuous and systematic. The Court held that they were not. 130
Professor Born has concluded that international assertions of jurisdiction
implicate special considerations-federal control over foreign relations and foreign
commerce. These considerations require a modification of the traditional due process
standards for application in international cases. 131 In addition, developments in
foreign countries attest to an emerging principle of international law which requires
that assertions of jurisdiction be reasonable.132 Therefore, Professor Born proposes
a standard of judicial jurisdiction in international cases that incorporates the dual
considerations of federal control over foreign relations and foreign commerce and the
reasonableness requirement. He recommends that:
124. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
125. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
126. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
127. Id. at 447.
128, Id. at 445.
129. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 410-11 (1984).
130. Id. at 417.
131. Born, Reflections, supra note 121, at 20-34.
132. Id. at 20.
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First, the level of constitutional scrutiny of jurisdictional claims should be raised in
international cases. United States courts should use restraint in deciding jurisdictional issues
in international cases, and jurisdiction over foreign defendants should be asserted only after
a clear showing of a sufficiently close relationship to the United States to alert the defendant
to the possibility of suit there. Second, the focus of constitutional analysis should be shifted
in international cases. In state law international cases, the due process clause should require
consideration of foreign defendants' national contacts, as well as their contacts with the
forum state. 133
Justifications for the stricter scrutiny are the prevention of friction with foreign
sovereigns, avoidance of foreign retaliation or interference with United States foreign
relations, and minimization of unfairness to individuals engaged in foreign
commerce. 134 The due process clause must therefore impose two related requirements
on assertions of judicial jurisdiction in international cases:
(1) United States courts should use particular caution in asserting long-arm jurisdiction over
foreign defendants and (2) United States courts should require closer connections between
the forum and the defendant than are necessary in domestic cases. 135
Under a basic principle of international law, the separate identities of the individual
states of the United States are irrelevant.' 36 Therefore, as Professor Born states,
"[floreign nations may properly complain when a United States court asserts
jurisdiction over a national who has no reasonable connection to the United
States. "137
2. A Federal Standard for Jurisdiction over Alien Defendants:
A National Aggregate Contacts Test
The Supreme Court in Asahi ignored the opportunity to provide a federal
standard to decide issues of personal jurisdiction in the international context. It chose
to continue its practice of using state standards of amenability to suit. Despite the
failure of Congress to act in this area, or perhaps because of that failure, the Supreme
Court refused to seize the initiative. In a footnote to the plurality opinion, Justice
O'Connor wrote:
We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over
alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts
between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.138
Other commentators and courts before Professor Born have recognized the
alternative not considered by the Supreme Court in Asahi. The general assumption is
that Congress, if it chose, could give the federal courts a nationwide range of personal
jurisdiction. State boundaries, after all, have no particular significance for fifth
133. Id. at 43.
134. Id. at 31-34.
135. Id. at 34.
136. Id. at 36.
137. Id. at 37 (emphasis in the original).
138. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1033 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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amendment due process.139 Through a number of statutes dealing with special federal
questions, Congress has provided for nationwide service of process. These statutes
contain a federal standard of amenability, within which exists authorization for an
aggregate contacts test in limited circumstances. 140 Cases have based jurisdiction on
section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,141 federal admiralty laws, 142 and
section 12 of the Clayton Act. 143
Professor Thomas F. Green, Jr. first formulated an aggregate contacts test in
1961.144 While maintaining the minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe, the
aggregate contacts test does not limit the inquiry to contacts with the state in which
the district court sits. The test considers all contacts throughout the United States. If
sufficient contacts are found, the court exerts jurisdiction, even if the defendant lacks
contacts with the forum. 145
The Eastern District of Tennessee adopted the aggregate contacts test one year
later in First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp. 146 In an action for damage to
cargo against a foreign corporate defendant, process was served in accordance with
the state's long-arm statute by virtue of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). The
court held that the federal court can consider the aggregate of a defendant's contacts
with the United States, not with just the forum state.
Other courts have considered this test, and some have based jurisdiction on it. 147
In Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 14 the District Court for the
District of Utah considered a patent infringement claim against a European ski-boot
manufacturer. Despite the defendant's claim of insufficient contacts with Utah, the
court held that:
where, as here, suit is brought against alien defendants, the court properly may consider the
aggregate presence of the defendant's apparatus in the United States as a whole. Due process
or traditional notions of fair play should not immunize an alien defendant from suit in the
United States simply because each state makes up only a fraction of the substantial
nationwide market for the offending product. 49
In Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann ,150 the District Court for the
139. R. CAsAD, supra note 7, sec. 4.06[5].
140. See generally Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional
Standard, 95 HARv. L. REv. 470, 478-80 nn.48-53 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Alien Corporations].
141. See Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909
(D. Md. 1971); Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D. 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
142. See Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164
(1982).
143. See Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, 83 F.R.D. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
144. Green, Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAry. L. REv. 967 (1961)
[hereinafter Green, Federal Jurisdiction].
145. See generally id.
146. 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
147. See Coats Co. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 459 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S.
Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659
(D.N.H. 1977); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975); Engineered Sports Prods. v.
Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973); Holt v. Kiosters Rederi AS, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973);
First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
148. 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973).
149. Id. at 728 (citation omitted).
150. 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977).
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District of New Hampshire found jurisdiction over a German corporation in an
antitrust action. 151 The court held that "the fact that the defendant is an alien and that
there is no other forum in which to litigate the claim should be taken into
consideration in determining whether a finding of jurisdiction meets the requisite
constitutional standards of fair play." 152
Other federal courts have, however, rejected the aggregate contacts test.
Arguably, the majority of them hold this view.' 53 Except where Congress has
specifically provided for nationwide service, most courts have declined to follow this
approach. 154 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) specifies that when service is made
in accordance with a state long-arm statute or rule, service of the federal court's
process can "be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the
statute or rule."' 155 Most federal courts have construed this to mean that a federal
court that uses the state process for invoking jurisdiction is bound by the same
limitations regarding the basis for jurisdiction as the state court would use.
The opinion of the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in EdwardJ.
Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co. 156 illustrates this majority view. The
court found jurisdiction under the Ohio long-arm statute in an antitrust action against
a Greek defendant:
[W]e feel that the appropriate inquiry to be made in a federal court where the suit is based
upon a federally created right is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the
United States....
Unfortunately, this course has not been left open to us by the federal rules or statutes. That
is, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has provided statute or rule whereby substituted
service may be made upon an alien corporation having certain minimal contacts with the
United States. And when substituted service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute, as
it was in this case, then the rules provide that service be made "under the circumstances and
in the manner prescribed in the statute. ... 157
In two other cases, DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc. 158 and Superior
Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, 159 the courts found that the defendants lacked minimum
contacts and dismissed the actions. In DeJames, the District Court for the District
of New Jersey found a Japanese corporation amenable to service in an action un-
der admiralty laws only if the corporation had sufficient contacts with the forum
state. 160 Service had been made under the New Jersey long-arm statute on the
151. The court did not consider whether service had been made under the Clayton Act. See supra note 143 and
accompanying text. If it had been, the court need not have resorted to the aggregate contacts test.
152. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.N.H. 1977).
153. Note, Alien Corporations, supra note 140, at 478.
154. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Allen
Organ Co. v. Kawai Musical Instruments Mfg. Co., 593 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v.
Fichet-Bauche, 568 F. Supp. 405 (D. Va. 1983).
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
156. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
157. Id. at 390 (quoting F.D. R. Civ. P. 4(e)) (emphasis in original).
158. 491 F. Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
159. 83 F.R.D. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
160. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1279 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 280 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
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Japanese corporation that regularly did conversion work on American ships in Japan.
In Superior Coal, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled
similarly that jurisdiction could only be exerted if the defendants' contacts with the
forum (Pennsylvania) met the minimum contacts test of International Shoe. The
complaint in this antitrust action against West German producers of coal alleged an
attempt to eliminate competition throughout the American coal market.161
3. Legislative Inaction and Judicial Deference
In the absence of congressional action, the majority of courts have declined to
adopt the aggregate contacts test.162 Courts continue to use state long-arm statutes
that limit the full enforcement of federal lawt 63 and produce inconsistencies in
jurisdictional results.' 64 Instead of taking the lead and providing guidance, the
Supreme Court has consistently put aside the issue of national contacts. While the
Supreme Court may shy from issues of international relations that are raised by
asserting jurisdiction over aliens, the Supreme Court should take advantage of the
opportunity to contrast the superior power of the federal government with that of the
states in the realm of personal jurisdiction. 65
The Supreme Court in Asahi cites Professor Born's article in Part II-B of the
plurality opinion that discusses the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over
Asahi.' 66 Obviously, the Court was aware of the relevance of the international
context. Under a raised level of scrutiny of judicial jurisdiction in an international
case, the Court in Asahi decided that the assertion of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.' 67 Bowing to the paramount need for prudence in the international
context, the Court dismissed the dispute in Asahi between foreign manufacturers.16 8
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Asahi is not a clarification of any test for the assertion
of personal jurisdiction. Indeed the highly unusual fact pattern in Asahi makes the
decision's precedential value questionable and limited. Subsequent lower court
161. If process had been served under the Clayton Act, the court was incorrect in finding no authorization for the
aggregate contacts test. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
162. See generally Note, Alien Corporations, supra note 140.
163. In federal cases, a trial may not be able to be held in its most appropriate location because the defendant has
insufficient contacts there. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 290 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that New Jersey was the most appropriate location for trial in an admiralty action, despite the
defendant's lack of minimum contacts with the state), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
164. Compare Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977) (jurisdiction
over German defendant in action alleging conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws based partly on New Hampshire long-arn
statute) with I.S. Joseph Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Minn. 1976) (no jurisdiction
under Minnesota law over the same defendant in action alleging same conspiracy).
165. Note, Alien Corporations, supra note 140, at 484.
166. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1033, 1035.
167. Id. at 1035.
168. See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Great care and
reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field."). See
generally Born, Reflections, supra note 123.
1988]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:853
decisions arguably indicate confusion as to the present state of the standard for federal
court jurisdiction.1 69 To assess personal jurisdiction, lower courts have seized upon
the two-step analysis of Asahi,170 the five factors used to determine reasonableness of
the exercise of jurisdiction, 17 1 and even the recognition of advertising in the forum
state as an important contact factor. 172 One court seemed to ignore the more
expansive view of purposeful availment and held jurisdiction was only proper if
contacts with the forum state proximately result from actions of the defendant himself
that create a substantial connection with the forum state. 173 In fact, when the
Louisiana Supreme Court found jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer and
distributor, the court exercised great care to distinguish Asahi.174 The Missouri
169. See, e.g., Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. W. Va. 1987). A volunteer who was injured during a
fireworks display sued the Japanese manufacturer of the fireworks. The District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia found that the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction. One distinction between the case and Asahi that the
court found significant was that Onda manufactured a finished product for sale to an identified customer in the United
States. Asahi was a component-parts manufacturer. Id. at 756. Particularly insightful in the context of this Case Comment
are the court's remarks regarding the law on personal jurisdiction:
The law on personal jurisdiction has not been cast in black and white simplicity since the Supreme Court's
widely acclaimed decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The Court's recent decisions, in particular
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, have muddied the wvatersfurther.
Id. at 754 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v. AVCO Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1010, 1015
(W.D. Mich. 1987) (after discussing the opinions in Asahi, holding that, "Until the Supreme Court resolves the debate
as to what constitutes minimum contacts under the stream-of-commerce theory, it is incumbent upon this court to follow
the lead of Justice Brennan and the Sixth Circuit.") (emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion that a finding of unreasonableness is a sufficient basis for defeating the exercise of personal
jurisdiction); Dupont Tire Serv. Center, Inc. v. North Stonington Auto-Truck Plaza, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 861 (D.R.I. 1987)
(stating that according to Asahi there are two steps in the analysis); State ex rel. Wichita Falls Gen. Hosp. v. Adolf, 728
S.W.2d 604 (Mo. App. 1987) (saying that Asahi clearly establishes that the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice language of International Shoe is a separate test related to, but not identical with, the minimum contacts test), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 292 (1987).
171. See, e.g., Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding the exercise of jurisdiction
unreasonable, when the five factors are evaluated); John Scott, Inc. v. Munford, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(analyzing five factors to determine if the assertion of jurisdiction transcended the fundamental precepts of due process);
Wallace v. Frank, 662 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (evaluating five factors of Asahi to determine reasonableness of
assertion of jurisdiction); Dupont Tire Serv. Center, Inc. v. North Stonington Auto-Truck Plaza, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 861
(D.R.I. 1987) (stating that the Supreme Court in Asahi held that a district court must consider five factors; finding that
the strength of the forum's interest in protecting resident corporations and the more neutral character of the other four
factors led to the conclusion that the assertion of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable); Blue Ball Properties, Inc., v.
McClain, 658 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Del. 1987) (applying the five factors and finding assertion of jurisdiction unreasonable);
Marriage of Tiscomia v. Tiscornia, 154 Ariz. 376, 742 P.2d 1363 (1987) (holding that the burden on the alien defendant
outweighed minimal state interests); Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 736 P.2d 2 (1986)
(examining the five factors and finding no personal jurisdiction when plaintiff, a Tennessee resident who was injured in
car accident in Arizona and soon thereafter moved to Florida, sued his insurance company in Arizona, where the insurance
company had no contacts). See also A.I.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 633 (M.D. Ga.
1987) (emphasizing that in the analysis of the five factors to determine reasonableness of jurisdiction special care should
be exercised in the international context); Grange Ins. Ass'n v. State, 49 Wash. App. 551, 744 P.2d 366 (1987)
(evaluating Asahi's factors, but balancing the burden on the defendant with the integrity of Washington's economy and
the safety of its cities; stating that Asahi implies the latter should be weighed heavily in determining reasonableness).
172. See, e.g., Poole and Kent Co. v. Equilease Assocs., 71 Md. App. 9, 523 A.2d 1018 (1987) (stating in dicta
that the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 307 Md. 270, 513 A.2d 874 (1986),
remanded, 107 S. Ct. 1341 (1987), in light of Asahi, apparently because Asahi recognizes advertising in the forum state
as an important contact factor); McGowan Grain, Inc. v. Sanburg, 225 Neb. 129, 403 N.W.2d 340 (1987) (finding
sufficient contacts through purposeful direction of actions, including advertising).
173. Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 736 P.2d 2 (1986).
174. MeBead Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd., 509 So. 2d 429 (La. 1987). The McBead court said that the Asahi
decision's plurality opinion discussed the requirement that the defendant's conduct be more purposefully directed at the
forum than the mere placement of the product in the stream of commerce. The concurring Justices did not, however,
subscribe to that requirement of a marked purposeful availment but did agree with the determination that exercise of
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Appellate Court in State ex rel. Wichita Falls General Hospital v. Adolf found Asahi
to have limited precedential value.175 The Wichita Falls court believed Asahi made
it clear that the minimal contacts required in the product liability area are less
stringent than in other areas. 176
The fact pattern and decision which perhaps illustrate the optimum utility of the
Asahi holding is Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo. 177 In Exxon, the survivor of a
shipwright killed in an accident in Singapore brought action against the owner and
operator of the vessel in a Texas state court. A federal court had previously granted
summary judgment on some claims and conditional dismissal on other claims on
forum non conveniens grounds. The Fifth Circuit held that dismissal on forum non
conveniens of an action by a federal district court precluded litigation of the same
claim in a Texas state court located in the same city.178 The court contended that
federal foreign policy interests do not disappear when purely private foreign parties
come to United States courts. 179 In a reference to Asahi, the court stated that even in
the seemingly domestic setting of a third party indemnification complaint in a product
liability case, the Supreme Court commanded a state court to rethink its analysis of
personal jurisdiction in light of inherent foreign policy implications. 180 "In situation
after situation," the court said, "Congress and the Supreme Court have made the
availability of courts in the United States to foreign plaintiffs and against foreign
defendants exclusively a matter of federal law, and they have consistently mandated
self-restraint in asserting jurisdiction over arguably foreign disputes."' 8 '
The Fifth Circuit affirmed what the Supreme Court avoided in Asahi, namely the
existence of a plenary power over international relations.182 Federal law, the court
jurisdiction did not comport with fairness and substantial justice. The McBead court said that clearly there was an
insufficient relationship among the California forum, Japanese defendant, and litigation of an indemnity issue. Id. at 433.
See also Dittman v. Code-A-Phone Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (distinguishing Asahi from the defendant
Japanese manufacturer who marketed a finished product and who had direct knowledge of the American market).
175. 728 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 292 (1987).
176. Id. at 608.
177. 817 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988). The Supreme Court considered the question of
whether an injunction entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas was permissible under
the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which generally bars federal courts from granting injunctions to stay
proceedings in state courts. This injunction prohibited Chick Kam Choo from litigating any claims relating to her
husband's death in the state courts.
Chick Kam Choo had asserted one claim under Singapore law and another under Texas state law. The district court
did not resolve the merits of her Singapore claim in its 1980 order. Id. at 1688. In regard to this claim, the Court held
that Exxon Corp. must present its pre-emption argument to the Texas state courts. Id. at 1691. The Court reasoned that
"when a state proceeding presents a federal issue, even a pre-emption issue, the proper course is to seek a resolution of
that issue by the state court." Id.
In contrast to the Singapore law claim, the validity of the claim asserted under Texas state law was adjudicated in
the original action. Id. The Court held that the injunction was permissible insofar as it enjoined the state courts from
considering this claim. Id. at 1692. However, because the district court's injunction barring the state court proceedings
was broader than necessary to protect or effectuate its judgment which dismissed Chick Kam Choo's lawsuit from federal
court, the Court remanded the case for the entry of a more narrowly tailored order. Id.
178. Id. at 309.
179. Id. at 321.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 321-22.
182. Id. at 321.
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contended, controls the international role of all courts in the United States. 183
Moreover, when the Fifth Circuit compared maritime to non-maritime commercial
actors, the court said that non-maritime actors can do a huge volume of business in
the United States without subjecting themselves to jurisdiction by simply avoiding
territorial contacts. 184 Citing to Asahi specifically, the Fifth Circuit noted that despite
a large number of sales, Asahi did not directly solicit business or make sales in the
United States and therefore avoided jurisdiction. 185
If the Fifth Circuit was able to identify the international context as the actual
issue in Asahi, the Supreme Court had to have been aware that the true basis of its
decision should have been and actually was foreign policy and its consequent
implications and not personal jurisdiction per se. The Supreme Court refused to
directly address this issue and relegated discussion of the international context to one
paragraph. 186 Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity that presented
itself to determine authorization of federal court personal jurisdiction over alien
defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts. 187
The Supreme Court should have approached Asahi as a question of jurisdiction
in an international controversy. 188 The due process standard derived from Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny should be refined for application in international cases.
A new standard should require that United States courts use restraint in asserting
long-arm jurisdiction over foreign defendants and that the defendant have closer
connections with the forum than are necessary in domestic cases. Furthermore, the
foreign defendant's contacts should be with the United States as a whole rather than
with a particular, individual state.
A due process standard for jurisdiction over foreign defendants that looks to
national contacts would serve important public policies. 189 First, such a test would
permit United States courts to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted
under international law. Second, the test would provide a better method for dealing
with foreign defendants whose contacts spread evenly, but sparsely, over a number
of states. Third, consideration of national contacts and expectations about being
required to litigate in United States courts would provide a reasonably well-tailored
measure of inconvenience to foreign defendants. Such a national contacts test would
bring United States courts into accord with international law and foreign relations, for
purposes of which the separate identities of the State are irrelevant.190
Asahi may have some small impact as an indication of the Supreme Court's
broadening view of personal jurisdiction. The decision may have greater significance,
however, for what the Supreme Court did not do. Once again, the Court refused to
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
187. Id.
188. See generally Born, Reflections, supra note 123, 34-44.
189. Id. at 37-38.
190. Id. at 36.
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address the issue of personal jurisdiction in international controversies. Until the
Court does, confusion will reign among lower courts who will continue to apply an
inappropriate domestic due process standard. The confusion "disserves the goals of
fairness, sound judicial administration, and friendly international relations." 191
Yvonne Luketich Blauvelt
191. Id. at 1.
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